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ABSTRACT
This paper is addressed to tactical doctrine planners
at all levels of responsibility in their service chains of
command. It presents a non- technical discussion of certain
missile-firing problems confronting the planner and offers
criteria for the solution of these problems. The cumulative
binomial distribution is used as a mathematical model of
survival probability applicable in the event of atomic or
nuclear warfare. The model becomes a measure of effectiveness
for the planner to decide which is the better of several poss-
ible alternative firing doctrines (or ship formations, missile
battery locations, etc.) he may have available. The model may
be extended to handle the allocation of aircraft or missiles
to enemy targets on a global basis. A second measure of effect-
iveness is developed for conventional-weapons warfare. The
latter model strongly considers the high cost of present-day
missiles and offers a basis for determining the number of
missiles to be fired at any given target when the kill probabi-
lity of the missile is known. The possibility of incorporating
an observation period in the missile-firing cycle is analyzed
and presented in the form of nomograms for decision purposes.
It is concluded that the employment of such an observation
period would be beneficial in connection with beam riding
missiles under certain conditions of the input parameters and





The Inception of the thoughts presented in this paper
took place during the summer of 1957 while the author was
temporarily assigned to the Operations Research Group of
the Convalr Missile Division of the General Dynamics Corp-
oration at Pomona, California. Although the personnel of
this group were largely concerned with a particular pro-
duct at the time, the background discussions were of con-
siderable help in formulating a general problem for this
presentation. In this respect, the author is indebted to
Messrs. Aubrey T. Gray and Richard E. Trueman of Convair
for their suggestions and guidance concerning the art of
missilery and the subject of firing doctrines. Mr. Trueman
had studied the matter of survival probability l-U and intro-
duced the subject and its possible use to the author. Part
of this paper concerns itself with a similar model and its
application from the tactical planner's viewpoint."
The material of Chapter II (considerations of Convention-
al-Weapons Warfare) was, in a sense, an experiment in the un-
known in that it was originally begun with no particular goal
in mind. The development, however, revealed mathematical sub-
stantiation of certain elements that were intuitively held to
be true, and the conclusions very closely approximate results
produced by other techniques involving considerably more
labor.
The possibility of incorporating an observation period
of some sort into the missile-firing cycle has been investi-
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gated before with somewhat mixed conclusions » J » {?} m ^q
material herein presented is a different approach to the prob-
lem and will lead to definite conclusions when viewed in the
light of specific parameter values.
It may be noted in perusal that this paper contains few
references to associated material. The reasons for this sit-
uation are twofold: a major portion of the literature of
missilery is classified in order to avoid disclosure of
such material, the author has pointedly not referred to class-
ified material v/here it does parallel or substantiate this
paper ; search of relevant papers reveals a plethora of
articles on design and reliability of future systems, but a
dearth of information concerning how best to use these pro-
jected products as well as those now available. This latter
situation would seem to indicate a fertile field for the
analyst.
The rather extensive library at the Naval Postgraduate
School contains but one thesis written on the subject of
missile systems as defense units L J . This article considers
a measure of effectiveness (cost per kill or kills per dollar)
with which this writer is somewhat at odds (see Chapter II
and [7] .). A recent thesis by Captain J.F. Tucker, USN, P]
concerns itself with a subject closely associated to that
undertaken here the torpedo firing problem. The compari-
son of missile and torpedo firings is interesting but suffi-
ciently apart that the mathematical models of analysis are
necessarily different.
For their kind patience, help, and constructive criticism
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on the organization and content of the paper, the author
expresses his sincere appreciation to Professors W.P.
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The addition of new weapons and the improved performance
of older weapons in the modern defense picture has created a
need for the re- examination of firing doctrines as they have
existed for many years. In particular, It is proposed to
consider the usage of short-range missiles in the light of
some of these developments. To discuss a specific system or
specific true values of the parameters would, of necessity,
classify the study for security reasons. It is intended,
therefore, to use representative values where necessary for
illustrative purposes to avoid such classification and thus
to provide wider dissemination of the thesis. It is hoped
that the material herein presented will provide food for
thought and a basis for the determination of actual firing
doctrines in specific installations "by appropriate tactical
doctrine planners.
In addressing the paper to "tactical doctrine planners",
the author is writing to a large group of people who occupy
various levels of authority in a service chain of command.
The material to be presented is not only applicable at the
field or shipboard level, but would also be of particular
value to the staff planner who may issue directives concern-
ing firing doctrines to subordinate units. The highest-level
planners might well incorporate such material in their con-
siderations when Issuing official service publications, or
when devising strategic or logistic plans for future opera-
tions.

To come more to the point, the problem at hand may be
stated thusly: It appears that firing doctrines and pro-
cedures for missile installations are not as firmly estab-
lished by directive from higher authority as are such doctrines
for more conventional weapons. In some cases, individual
units have been left to set up their own procedures in this
respect on the basis of their current experiences or informa-
tion from any available source. In time, this situation will
surely change and firm procedures will be established at higher
levels. During this interim period, however, someone must set
forth doctrines for use in the event of war today this
someone is a tactical planner who, today, may be occupying a
relatively low-level position in his service organization.
The author, therefore, addresses his work to this group of
people as well as to the higher-level planners in the sincere
hope that it can provide further insight to the problems of
missile firing and aid in offering solutions for specific
matters for whomever may be confronted with missile doctrine
planning at the moment.
Today's firing doctrine must consider a multitude of
problems heretofore unpresented. This investigation will
discuss aspects of some of these major items. Doctrines will
be divided into two categories at the beginning by consider-
ing special-weapons warfare and conventional-weapons warfare.
The conventional-weapon discussion will then consider two
aspects of the problem confronting a planner: the number of
missiles to be fired and the incorporation of an observation
period into the firing cycle.

It seems Intuitive that the measure of effectiveness for
a defense system might well be different under an attack which,
if successful, will obliterate the defending forces or the
installation they are protecting with almost a certainty
versus that of an attack which, when successful, will damage
the defending forces to a greater or lesser extent with an
attached probability of something less than one. Again, the
cost of the weapon of today, the missile, is considerably
higher that the cannon balls of yesteryear. Defending forces
are, to an extent, missile-limited from a cost and productive-
capability viewpoint. Or, they may actually be tactically
limited by the number of such pieces of hardware they have
on hand in their magazines. Surely, this, too, must affect
the measure of effectiveness.
Considerations such as the above led to the division of
this paper into its present sub-heads. It is realized that
the general problem could be approached from many directions.
The division could be made by considering saturation attacks
as compared with something less than this form, such as attacks
of a wave form, stream, or by single snoopers. Each of these
latter classifications should account for a complete spectrum
of target altitudes and speeds. And then one would like to
Include the effects of a variable number of missiles per
salvo and varying system time delays. Complete investigation
of each of these cases, regardless of the Initial division
of the problem, would increase the complexity and content
considerably and would seem to serve little purpose In a
thesis of this type. Instead, effort will be made to cover

the scope of aspects such as these by treating certain sub-
jects pararaetrically and others by illustration with realistic
values while still avoiding reference to any known or planned
missile or missile system.
The thoughts presented, then, will be a possible start-
ing point for those interested in the field, a point from
which, with specific Inputs in mind, progress can be made in





A very simple measure of effectiveness describing systems
designed to defend against an aircraft bearing atomic or nuclear
weapons would be one which measures the effectiveness of the
possible defense doctrines by the probability of survival of
such an aircraft. If each trial (or missile firing) is assumed
an independent event
:
Pfc s probability of kill of the aircraft in one shot (it
is envisioned here that this quantity will be available
to the planner essentially as a function of range)
P
s s
probability of survival of the aircraft
m s number of missiles fired
Then, for the several cases:
(1) where the target is orbiting or circling the firing in-
stallation at a fixed range (a reconnaissance plane);
(2) several missiles are fired simultaneously at the same
target; or
(3) the computation for survival is desired on an inbound
target and the average P^ over the firing interval is
considered (this assumption will produce a close approxi-
mation) ;
the following holds:
where P^. may also be thought of as the salvo kill probability




Using this simple criterion of survival probability as
a measure of effectiveness, the doctrine achieving the mini-
mum probability P Q would then be measured as best. But such
a measure, although considering the number of missiles fired
(m), has not penalized the effectiveness for excessively
large m. Obviously, if no penalty is paid for missiles launch-
ed, near perfection can be achieved by increasing this m to
some large number with a Pk of only .4, (111=) 10 missiles
could be fired and the desirable low measure of (P se) .006
would be achieved.
This simple measure would thus seem unsatisfactory since
it does not offer the defense a true picture of performance
unless the comparison of doctrines is made for a specific
value of m. Yet the defense does not want to consider it-
self missile-limited by making such a specification of m in
that it is really willing to fire all of the available weapons
if necessary to deter this enemy effort ( the alternative is
certain destruction by this enemy). The latter thought might
suggest considering the effort the enemy must put forth to
evade successfully the defense system, that is, the number of
aircraft (N) the enemy must mount to give Pn probability that
n or more aircraft will survive the defense.
Evaluation of the required number of aircraft or raid
size (N) is dependent on both missile kill probability (P^)
and the system saturation level (Ns ), the latter being the
maximum number of aircraft that can be engaged at any one
instant using a particular doctrine. Until the saturation
level is reached, the probability of any given aircraft sur-
viving the defense is dependent only on P^. This probability
6

(Pk ) itself depends on the probability of detection and
identification, the reliabilities of the missile and ground
system as well as their operablllty factors, the tracking
reliability (for beam riders), the lethality of the warhead,
the reliability of the fuze, type and size of the target, its
course and speed, and numerous other variables. The assump-
tion is made, however, that an overall Pk is known and the
complete range (O^P^^l) of this quantity will be investigat-
ed.
If it is desired to construct a mathematical model for
the probability Pn that the number of aircraft surviving a
raid of N aircraft will equal or exceed n, given that the
probability of kill of the missiles being fired at each of
the raiding planes is Pk , the following procedure can be em-
ployed:
the probability of any one of the N planes surviving
the probability of all of the remaining (N-l) planes being
shot down = P^" 1
the probability of these events occurlng together
the selection of the one plane from N planes
Therefore, for survival of
1 plane, P
x














For the probability P of the survival of n planes, or
(rn-1) planes, or (n+2) planes, and so on (that is, to "equal
or exceed n") out to the total N planes, the result is
Vg-»(i-pk ) N
r
*„ - 4 vrx(^) :
x=n
It is seen that this probability is expressed conveniently by
the Cumulative Binomial Distribution for which there are tables
available [6] for variable N, x, and P, to give Pn .
Assuming, for instance, that the enemy is willing to pay
the attrition price of a .80 probability Pn that n or more
of their aircraft will survive, the function developed above
can be plotted for a spectrum of N and P^.. Figure 1 presents
such a plot. The curves show the interrelationship of N and
Pk . It is seen that, for a given raid size (N), as the kill
probability (Pv-) of the defending installation increases, the
enemy has less and less favorable chances of having n (or more)
survivors get through the defense. Viewed differently, for a
constant P, , the number of survivors increases as the raid
size increases.
In order to utilize this mathematical model as a measure
of effectiveness the planner should first determine the satura-
tion level (N
g )
of a doctrine he desires to examine. This
level is a function of the inherent system delays (reload,
target assignment, tracking time, computor solution, launcher
synchronization, target parameters such as speed, altitude,
















practice times plus representative values for the target
parameters. Making a similar computation for a second doc-
trine with which it is desired to compare the first, it is
found that the relative effectiveness of the two can quick-
ly be measured.
As an example, consider two doctrines A and B where A
might be a doctrine which proposes firing two missiles at
each target and B proposes firing single missiles instead.
With two director systems and their associated launchers
available and using the average Pk over the (inbound) firing
distance, it might well be determined that A can only fire on
half as many targets as B (i.e. saturation level of A is half
that of B) due to a high launcher reload time. Assuming the
saturation level of B is, say, 8 targets, and that the single-
missile kill probability Pk is .4, the parameters become:
A: N
s
= 4, Pk = .64
B: N g z 8, Pk = .4
Comparison of Two Firing Doctrines
Number of .80 probability of n or more






















9 7 (9-4+2*) 5 (9-8+4*)
10 8 (10-4+2*) 7 (10-8+5*)
* From Figure 1.
(For N= 5, the comparison shows that doctrine A allows 1 plane
to get through with a 100$ certainty (since saturation level
is 4) and 1 or more with a probability of .80, hence nA=2;
B allows for 2 or more with a probability of .80, hence
nB= 2.)
The measure would seem to indicate here that for attack-
ing aircraft numbering 4 or less, it would be better to employ
doctrine A; for numbers greater than 4, doctrine B is more
effective. (See Appendix II for a further discussion of this
matter.) The Gunnery Officer can, of course, make such a
determination (of raid size, and knowing the approximate open-
fire and cease-fire ranges and hence P^) as the raid approaches
from a distance, and issue the appropriate instructions based
on his prior comparison by a method such as this.
The example used for illustrative purposes considered
values of P^ and N Introduced by a variation in the number
of missiles per salvo. It should be realized that the method
of evaluation is general and will handle values of Pk and N
introduced by a variation of any sort. In a shore installa-
tion, for instance, different parameter values could very well
be introduced by different battery locations; the method could
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of different formations
involving several defending ships in a similar manner. Appen-
dix II indicates further uses for this particular measure of
effectiveness from an even broader viewpoint.
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In a way, this scheme of evaluation avoids direct con-
sideration of the number of missiles fired. It throws the
burden of "proof of effectiveness" on the enemy (although,
of course, he remains unaware of this fact). It says to
him, "How many planes are you willing to put in the air to
insure that you will get 1 (or 2, 3» etc.) through to the
target?" And the doctrine planner says, "I will measure
the effectiveness of my doctrine by the amount of effort
you have to put forth to accomplish your purpose." In a
global war, the enemy obviously might not be able to pay
continuously the price to defeat such maximized schemes and
the planner has achieved his desired effectiveness. It was
seen that the method applies to saturation as well as non-
saturation attacks and handles single snooper raids, stream
attacks, or wave attacks depending on the manner of computa-
tion of N . Actually, computation for the worst form of attack,
s
the wave form, will produce a lower N Q than for a stream attack,
but, in any case, a tabulation such as that shown above will
offer a quick choice as to the best of several possible doc-
trines under the attack conditions. It is suggested that such
tabulations be made for representative target altitudes and
speeds based on the fixed, known parameters of the particular
defending installation, and then be reduced to specific pro-





In considering the formulation of firing doctrines
applicable to conventional-weapons warfare, it should be
kept in mind that the expected damages to be sustained by
the defending installation are considerably less than under
conditions of atomic or nuclear warfare. The matter of accept-
ability, or the cost of carrying out a decision to a success-
ful conclusion, assumes a greater Importance. The reader must
now divorce himself from further consideration of the special-
weapons problem and its conclusions and consider missile fir-
ing in the light of this element of cost. A few additional
thoughts on such matters seem appropriate.
Basically, the conventional form of warfare takes on the
aspect of some sort of a (cruel) game the defense has cer-
tain resources, the attacking forces have resources. How much
does the defense want to pay, or can they afford to pay, to
Inflict damage on the enemy, remembering that if the defense
falls to harm the enemy target at all, the payload the enemy
carries does not have that certainty of destroying the defend-
ed installation that must be assumed in consideration of
special-weapons warfare? If the defense knew with a good degree
of certainty, for example, that the attackers would drop a bomb
which would cause no Injuries and only cause minor shrapnel
damage to a small portion of the defense installation, would
they be willing to launch, say, six expensive missiles at the
attackers? Four? Two? Any?
13

The defending forces do not know this information "with
a good degree of certainty", but probability tells them that
this is what they might "expect" in the way of damage from,
say, a very high-flying, small-payload bomber. And, at the
same time, it tells the defense that they have a poor chance
of hitting this high-flying enemy plane at an extreme range
an altitude (possibly even with the six missiles!), only
a slightly better chance as the enemy target closes, and not
too good a kill probability at the enemy's bomb-release line.
How many missiles should be launched, if any? Would the many-
thousand-dollar effort be worth the expenditure? Is it accept-
able? This chapter will concern itself with such matters.
It is seen that a measure of effectiveness designed to
cover this new set of conditions might well have different
elements than that developed in the first chapter. It might
also be somewhat difficult to define clearly. Strategic
measures might deal with the tasks assigned to the defense
system. If the missile system were quite capable of making
targets fly higher over the defended area (through enemy fear
of the missile- system capability) and thus fall prey to a
friendly combat air patrol, or if it denied the use of slow
reconnaissance planes to the enemy, it might well be an
"effective" system for the strategic planner. But the field
commander, commanding officer of a ship, or tactical planner
is more vitally concerned with the actual use of the system
than its general employment. Once it has been strategically
designed, is it tactically most effective within the limits
imposed? It must therefore be recognized that there may be
14

numerous "measures of effectiveness" for the conventional-
weapons problem. The author will endeavor here to indicate
the thought process in developing one such measure which, as
will be seen, can be used to indicate the number of missiles
to launch at a target for any given value of Pk .
One might feel that any measure of effectiveness should
consider the number of planes or targets which penetrate the
defense system. In this case, the defense would like to shoot
missiles only at those targets that it knows will penetrate,
hence some concept of conservation of missiles for the hlgher-
Pk targets must be introduced in that these higher-Pk targets
are presumably closer to their desired destination and hence
have a better probability of penetration. It should be remem-
bered, however, that to penalize a doctrine by low-rating it
in cases where targets did, in fact, penetrate but could not
be taken under fire for lack of missiles on hand to launch
would be a bit unfair. And this would surely occur if pene-
tration itself were the sole criterion.
A counting of just bursts themselves (which might be in-
duced by a method advocating the averaging of kill probability
over an area) does not really give proper weighting to indivi-
dual bursts. Surely some of these bursts have a greater kill
probability attached to them than others. The value of the
present-day missile alone would seem to dictate not consider-
ing it in the same class as the conventional projectile and
fuze of several years ago. It is felt that bursts themselves,
or fire power, as a measure of effectiveness would only be




Kills per missile or kills per dollar are similarly
unsatisfactory since they over-rate a doctrine that fires
but a few missiles at only "sure bets". Walsh discusses
this matter at some length in his "Inadequacy of Cost per
'Kill 1 as Measure of Effectiveness" in a recent issue of
The Journal of the Operations Research Society of America. [7]
When one attempts to inject "value of a target" into
the problem, the tactical planner is left with a guessing
game as to his true effectiveness, for who can say what the
mission or pay-load of any given enemy aircraft is? "Value
of the defense area" similarly opens the discussion to many
Issues beyond the realm of clear mathematical analysis with
the techniques presently available.
It is felt that "proper utilization of missiles on hand"
should have some bearing on the measure if the defending
installation has only one missile to launch and successfully
obtains a kill with this device it is surely 100$ effective
within the limitations Imposed despite the possibility that
more targets may have been available. Consideration of this
factor (i.e. proper utilization) also introduces the dollar
element into the picture which has a natural importance.
On the other hand, if the defense had two missiles available,
launched one and obtained a kill, yet failed to engage a
second available target, there should be some penalty paid
in the Judging of performance, since it is evident that
complete "proper utilization" was not employed.
It thus appears that the important ingredients are "kills
16

obtained", "utilization of missiles available", "number of
kills available", and "missiles actually fired". These
elements may be combined by multiplying the kills actually
obtained per kill that was available ("within envelope" or
"available missilewise") times the kills obtained per missile
fired. Then, a doctrine which falls to kill all of its
"available" targets will be penalized accordingly on a rela-
tive scale, and one which fires more than the necessary
quantity of missiles will receive a similar lower rating.




E - expected kills
m r missiles fired
Ear maximum single- shot expectation of kill (given that the
target is "within the envelope" and there is a "missile
available") per plane times the number of planes.
It is seen that the units are:
M.E. = (kills) 2 = kills
(missiles) ( kills ) (planes) missile
plane
It should be noted that the eventual units are similar
to those of a measure previously cast aside. These "kills
per missile", however, are somewhat removed from the first
proposal by the same name as will be seen in the below illustra-
tions. The measure itself is an efficiency rating in that it
represents an output (plane kills) divided by an input (missiles
fired). Although the measure contains several familiar elements,
17

some of which are frequently considered effectiveness measures
themselves, particular care need be exercised should it be used
to compare, for instance, the capabilities of different misslleB
or missile systems.
In order to examine this measure and see hov; representative














B: "do not fire
excess missi
Case Number:
Missile Limited Not Missile Limited




Assuming Pk - 1.0 (for facility of presentation and
understanding of the illustration) and examining the above





























2 20 1 10 10 10 do) 2 1.00
do)(io)
3 20 2 40 20 40 (20) 2 .50
(io;(2oj
4 20 1 20 20 40 (20)
2 1.00
(20M20)
5 20 2 20 10 40 (10)2 .25
(20M20)
6 20 1 10 10 40 do) 2 .50
(10M20)
Case 1 illustrates how the measure penalizes for firing
excessive missiles (2 per target) and in addition for not
producing results commensurate with the reasonable expecta-
tion ( single- shot, expected kills = 10, actual kills obtained
r 5).
Case 2 rates the performance 100$ effective for getting 10
planes for 10 missiles despite the fact that 20 targets were
available since it was stated that only 10 missiles were
available (or 10 "kills" within range as an alternative usage
of this device)
.
Case 3 shows the result of firing too many missiles but still
killing all available targets.




Case 5 demonstrates a measure for a system which shoots too
many missiles and does not even use these effectively. This
case compares no better than Case 1 which shot down only half
as many targets but was missile limited. Presumably, if
system 1 were not so limited, it would have doubled up and
shot 10 planes for 20 missiles, being no more effective as a
system (i.e. not having received an additional penalty for
this condition)
.
Case 6 shows the result of taking only half the available
targets under fire and killing all of these 50$ effective.
This compares with Case 3 which illustrated missile waste.
Of course, this example was synthetic and almost trite,
for one can never expect T, = 1.00. The next step is to ex-
amine a practical problem now that the terms in the formula





.7 .7 .5915 .4508
.5 .5 • 5625 .5104
.3 • 3 .4335 .4796
(Note: P, here does not include ground system operabillty)
The computation of the entries here proceeds as follows:
for the top right cell,
C.7 + .3(.7) + .09(.7)J 2 = .4508
3(.7)
The table above clearly indicates that, as reliability
20

(or kill probability) increases, fewer missiles should be
fired since the effectiveness rating drops off sharply after
the first shot for these higher-
P
k values. This would indi-
cate the presence of some Law of Diminishing Return. Such
Indications are also presented by the probability of kill
itself when viewed on a percentage basis. For one shot
P^ = »1\ for the addition of a second shot P^o= »91» or an
increase in the original probability of only .21 {30% in-
crease). This same missile, if fired with an original
P.- .3 would produce a second shot increase of the same .21
which is now a 70% increase in the original (.3) kill prob-
ability! The conclusions to be drawn from both the cumula-
tive kill probability and the effectiveness rating are that
if it is considered worth while to shoot one missile with
P^r »3, it is worth while to shoot 2, and, as a matter of
additional fact (as will shortly be seen) , 3, or possibly
even 4!
Reflection on the material developed to this point
reveals that a rather awkward tool for practical use has
been produced. The indications are clear that a "picture"
is needed at this point to aid in the thinking process.
The Effectiveness Rating vs Rounds Fired for various values
of Pk is plotted and Included here as Figure 2.
From the peaks of the curves in Figure 2, one obtains
the curve of Rounds Fired for Maximum Effectiveness vs P^
shown here as Figure 3* The Percent Increase in Kill Prob-
ability (vs Rounds Fired After First Round as the abscissa)
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convenience (Figure 4) as is the Cumulative Kill Probability
(vs Rounds Fired) (Figure 5). The latter plot indicates
where the Maximum Effectiveness Curve lies in relation to
the Cumulative Kill Probability. Although the discrete
nature of rounds fired makes it somewhat difficult to pre-
sent an accurate and complete picture of all possible cases,
it is seen from an examination of Figure 5 that the rating
scheme says that a cumulative kill probability of (about)
.7 (or better, if P. itself is greater than .7 to begin with)
is near optimum. When effort is made to get a higher cumula-
tive kill probability than this value, more missiles are ex-
pended than really should be (that is, input is too great for
the output attained). The Law of Diminishing Return is affect-
ing the results in this region.
This particular measure of effectiveness might be rather
difficult to work with as a tactical aid as has been Implied
above, but it can aid the doctrine planner in his thinking
and computations. For instance, should the doctrine call for
two-missile salvos or single-missile salvos? The measure
indicates that the answer is variable depending on P^: if
the pick-up is close in (and P, is high), shoot singles
(see Figure 3)» The extra missile is costly to shoot and
increases the cumulative kill probability only by a small
percentage (see Figure 4). On the other hand, if the doc-
trine being planned is to cover wave attacks and early shots
must be fired (low P.) to enable the firing of some shots on
all of the targets (or as many as possible), the number per
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of the system. Everything considered, a doctrine designed
against single plane attacks or stream attacks (at sufficient
interval) might well be to hold fire until the salvo P, is
about .65 or .7 (from the Effectiveness Curve of Figure 5)
•
A consideration of the problem confronting the planner
at this exact point in the preparation of a good firing doc-




FIRE AND OBSERVE VERSUS FIRE AND SWITCH
Having provided for the firing of a salvo (single-missile
or otherwise) determined in the manner proposed by the previous
chapter (or by any other suitable criterion), the doctrine
planner might well now wonder whether he should provide for
the immediate slewing on to a second target and the preparation
to fire at it, or whether he should incorporate an observation
period in the firing cycle to see if his first salvo was
successful in its purpose. The following terms and symbols
are defined for a further study of this matter:
Fire and Observe a doctrine utilizing observation by
radar or boreslght telescope of the target after salvo
burst for time t to note the presence or absence of a
kill. If a kill is observed, a new target is engaged;
if a kill is not observed within tQ , a second salvo is
launched against the same target^and the effect is again
observed.
Fire and Switch a doctrine requiring each salvo to be
launched against a different target (unless there are no
different or unengaged targets in which case a previously-
engaged target not yet destroyed may be re-engaged). For
homing missiles, this Infers transfer to a second target
as soon as the first target is fired on; for beam riders,
the switching process would occur Immediately after a
burst (not premature, however) on the first target.
A Kill target is observed to explode immediately upon
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burst of missile. (In the discussion that follows, ref-
erence will be made to "missile kill probability", "missile
bursts", and so on. "Salvo" can replace "missile" where
desired if "salvo kill probability" is utilized in place
of "missile kill probability" and a suitable counting of
the numbers of missiles per salvo is employed where neces-
sary.)
B Kill target is observed to commence falling within a
few seconds after burst.
C Kill target will fall within a longer period after
burst, say five minutes.
D Kill mission of the target has been thwarted (bomb-
bay doors Jammed, plane discontinues attack, etc.).
P eventual state of missile, where
P=1.0 for success (kill obtained); P=0.0 for failure (kill
not obtained)
.
t, time from launch to burst.
t^ missile mean failure time (where failure occurs after
launch and before burst).
t-, time to reload launcher.
t average time after burst for observing a kill.
t time required to switch to a different target (Note:
s
this quantity will be measured from "leave the present
target" to "fire at a different target".).
P probability of observing an actual kill within time tQ .
6 ground system operability. It is considered that the
ground system might be represented by the following bar
diagram where the whole bar represents the total number
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of trials of the event of ground system operability:
EZZZZZgZZZZZZCHZ
The unshaded area (U) includes all those times the ground
system fails to operate when the appropriate switches are
thrown. gn then equals _±L.° S+U
g ground system reliability. Out of the segment S of
the above bar, part of the time the operation will be re-
liable (R) and part unreliable (K) as follows:
Not reliable times of operation would include periods




mQ missile operability. Similarly defined.
m missile reliability. Similarly defined.
m number of missiles fired.
p kill probability of an operable missile (which is now
the kill probability as a function of miss distance, the
latter being a function of gr and m_)
•
T. expected total engagement time for an i"1 doctrine
(three will be considered, hence i = 1,2,3).
P. expected engagement kill probability for an I^*1 doc-
trine.
M, expected mortality rate (kills/second) for an lttl
doctrine, = __i. M may then be thought of as the expected
Ti
number of successes or kills to occur divided by the ex-
pected total time to achieve these successes. M will be
used as the measure of effectiveness in the discussion
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that follows. It has been selected in particular in that
it not only considers the kills brought about by the use
of a doctrine but also introduces the time required to
produce these kills into a rate concept. The latter
device is desirable since the effect of adding a time
increment (tQ ) in the firing cycle is being investigated.
A high value of M, as seen from above, will be a desirable
feature of any particular doctrine; if M^> M*, doctrine
i will be considered better than doctrine J.
Assumption: firing time Itself is negligible.
As the various types of kills defined above are consider-
ed, a planner might think he would like mostly type A's, then
B's, C's, and D' s in that order. For actual purposes, however,
B kills or C kills (or possibly even D kills) are Just as satis-
factory as A kills. The synthetic device of typing kills Is
introduced by a lack of intelligence concerning the damage (if
any) that has been done to the target, or a state of ignorance
of the eventual value of P. Although the planner would like
to be certain immediately of the event by observing an A kill
(tQrO), he might be willing to wait for a type B before firing
again (tQ > 0) to avoid the waste of 'bver kills" (should he de-
cide to shoot at the same target again only to observe the
target fall as a result of first missile damage after having
already fired the second and it has not yet reached the target).
It seems possible that he could even afford timewise to wait
for some C kills (t^ 0). In practice he would probably want




Such thoughts have been entertained since the arrival
of high-cost and high-kill-probability devices in the weapons
field. In view of the fact that a fire-and-observe doctrine
(t >0) by its inherent nature generates a high probability
of kill for each target engaged (since the doctrine assumes
missiles are fired at any engaged target until a kill is ob-
served) and an economy of missiles (since the "over kills"
noted above are largely eliminated), but will increase the
total time devoted to each target, it would seem appropriate
to investigate the effect of this observation period on the
mortality rate.
In considering the several quantities defined above, it
should be noted that the quantity m might not be as clearly
separative as g in that some missiles will be inoperable on
the launcher and others, whether they be beam riders or homers,
will only develop to be inoperable while they are in the air.
The former group would equally affect any firing doctrine in
that they must be replaced before firing can occur and such
time of replacement must be added to the total time required
for a cycle of any doctrine when it, in fact, occurs. This
group will not be considered here. But the latter group can
be identified at or before burst, and such identification
together with the true value of mQ could well affect the
feasibility of fire and observe versus fire and switch.
Proper Identification of this group would enable higher en-
gagement kill probabilities and missile economy without pay-
ing the full penalty of a decreased rate of fire. Thus, before
observing target kills, operabillty of the missile in the air
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should first be observed. If the odds an observer would be
willing to quote on the eventual state of P are examined as
a function of time, the presentation would look something
like the following diagram (Note: here, odds of "1.0" might
mean the observer would be willing to offer 100 to on
missile success — i.e. he is sure of the eventual state of












Odds on Missile Success versus Time
Path 1 shows odds on P = mQp while missile is on the
launcher. As time increases after the launch, the odds in-
crease as the missile continues to fly properly (capture occurs
for beam riders, etc.). A failure occurs and the missile does
not reach the target or burst does not occur. Thus, P drops
to and the odds the observer offers are to 100 on success
I.e. he is certain of failure and makes "no offer".
Path 2 starts as above, but continues on to a burst. The
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observer now knows the missile was completely operable and
the kill is now dependent only on the kill probability (p)
of the warhead (early or late burst, vulnerability of target,
etc.)* As time Increases, the odds begin to fall (due to a
state of ignorance, the observer begins to lack confidence
in P being 1.0 since he does not see the target fall), but
P assumes a value of 1.0 as a kill is observed and the odds
jump to 100 to 0.
For path ^, as time increases, the odds continue to drop
off as, successively, an A kill is not observed, a B kill falls
to occur, and so on. The odds would drop to to 100 when/if
the observer ever received intelligence to the effect that the
mission of the enemy plane was, in fact, accomplished (bomb
dropped, pictures taken, etc.), that is, he determined P = 0.
Consider now the three doctrines following where the time
cycle begins at "fire" and ends at "ready to fire" a second
shot:
Doctrine 1: fire and switch for a homing missile
pl = m p
Tl = t 8
n = !Eop
^s
Doctrine 2: fire and switch for a beam-riding missile
P 2 = P
T2 = t f [(1-mo) + (l-m )
2
+ — + (l-m ) m] tb + t fl
{t-j_< tf , with a single launching rack available; or
a standby launcher available; or
more than one rack per launcher.
Since the term [(l-m ) + (l-m ) 2 + — + (l-m ) m] is a




mQ) for large m. Thus, the probability of more than one
v m /
failure during flight before the observance of a successful
burst has been included. Hence,
t2 = tf (i=2a) + tb + t 8
Doctrine 3 J fire and observe (for homing and/or beam-riding
missiles)
P3 = 1.0, p>
T3 = l {&f £g) * *b *J *s} + §f(^=a) + *b *o] •
• [(i-Pop) + (i-p p)
2
+ — + d-p p)m]
p
M, = ZJl . all values of p.
3 T3
This formula bears further explanation in that it represents
a change of the thinking pattern and of formula construction.
Doctrines 1 and 2 represented no particular difficulties in
that there was no question as to how many times a specific
time increment entered into the computation. Each increment
entered only once in the denominators of the mortality rates
except in the case of tf in doctrine 2 where it was seen that
allowance was made for the probability of more than one fail-
ure during flight before the observance of a successful
burst (in fact, allowance was made for one failure, or two,
three, and so on)
.
In considering doctrine 3, a similar allowance must be
made for the probability of more than one observation period
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"before success (and then add on the switching time increment).
But if an allowance of this sort is made, then the numerator
of Mr* must also be changed. The fact that a success is not
observed during the time tQ does not necessarily mean that
a success has not occurred; pQ , the probability of observing
a success, may have a value less than 1, and the numerator
of M-, will be successively taking on values larger than p
and approaching 1.0 as a limit as additional possible
missiles are fired.
These difficulties can be avoided by looking at the
mortality rate in the manner presented. The reader may
prefer to think of the process as computing the expected
time (denominator) for one success (numerator).
It will be noted that if p=0, the mortality rate for
doctrine 3 becomes zero; if p=1.0 (assuming for the moment
that p =1.0), the mortality rate becomes the same as that
for doctrine 2 with the addition of the time increment t
in the denominator; if p=.5> the mortality rate for 3 will
exceed that for 2 provided tQ is less than t Q doctrine
3 here advocates a second shot at the same target, doctrine
2 would fire at a new target; and so on. It is seen after
further critical examination that the mortality rate for 3
performs the same desired function as that of 1 and 2 des-
pite the fact that its development was somewhat different.
The next step will be to compare the mortality rates of
the several doctrines. Doctrine 3 will be better than doctrine










p p mo '
or t
8
(l-p)-(l-p )[t 8 tf i^o + tj>t >
The equation has been reduced to this particular form so
that it may be examined conveniently by a graphic presentation.
Figure 6 shows a nomogram of the function developed above. It
will be noted that all of the quantities in this function are
readily determinable from available information t^ as a
tabulated function of the firing range, p similarly tabulated
on the basis of theoretical considerations concerning the
missile itself; m , t g , and t^ from statistical analysis of
operations except the quantity p . p is, of course,
directly related to t Itself. If t is large, p might well
be high; that is, the longer the observation time after burst,
the more likely that a kill will be observed if it has, in fact,
occurred. If but several seconds are available to observe
after a burst, there is a smaller probability that a kill will
be observed in fact, in accordance with the definitions
of the four types of kills (A, B, C, and D) , "several seconds"
Implies that only an A kill may be observed during this per-
iod (with an attached probability), the possibility of a B kill
(with a similar attached probability), and a very small poss-
ibility of a C kill (depending on the length of the "several
seconds" as compared with the definition "within a few seconds"
of the B kill. Increasing tQ thus allows the observer the



































of noting a C kill if it did occur and the target will fall
during this early period of the five-minute definition time
allowed. (The time scale of these definitions is, of course,
a relative one as has been pointed out earlier.) It will be
noted that having any t > would also allow the observer to
note missile operabillty in the firing of a homer since it
implies that a second shot is not fired until (at least) a
successful burst is observed.
Although the role of the Operations Analyst is tradition-
ally one of Impartiality, there is an obligation to present
the facts in such a manner as to make the course of decision
clear. The author thus feel3 compelled to Introduce a plea
for the case of fire and observe. It appears quite evident
that when switching time Is high and/or kill probability is
low, the utilization of an observation period will be bene-
ficial.
Comparing doctrines 3 and 1, it is seen that the former
will be better than the latter when the following inequality
holds:
M3 > Mx
M^T^TVt 8 + fV Bq
PoP
m^sPo-'tf) " t sPoP tf - tb > t >
Again the equation has been reduced to a particular form
for graphic presentation purposes. Figure 7 Is a nomogram of
this function. It is not Intended that Figure 7 would have































m *.33 5 1.0i «
Step h proceed ABCOEFG
2« connect C8E' to obtain H
3' proceed HJK




parameter values. Examination of the Illustrative example on
the figure reveals that all of the assumed values are fairly
reasonable except the missile operablllty (m ). The extreme-
ly low value of m =.33 Indicates that the use of an observa-
tion period of (tQ ) 20 seconds is desirable. If a more
reasonable value of this parameter had been selected, it will
be noted that tQ would be sharply reduced. This latter re-
duction would in turn reduce pQ (in accordance with the discus-
sion above) which would further reduce tQ . The cumulative
effect of this change in mQ would be to produce a negative
t which is to say that M-pt M-^. Examination of the nomogram
for the effect of other possible variations is interesting.
Doctrine 3 could compare favorably with doctrine 1
under conditions of high missile operablllty when a system
which has a high switching time and a low kill probability
fires a high-velocity missile (low tb ) . Since the effect
of employing higher missile velocities will be to decrease
the number of possible intercepts on an inbound target, as
is shown in Appendix III, increased kill probability and/or
Increased maximum firing range must accompany such employment
(higher missile velocities) for it to be acceptable as an
improvement over present systems.
It thus seems doubtful that fire and observe will com-
pare favorably with fire and switch for homers at this time
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DEVELOPMENT AND ILLUSTRATION OF THE
SIMPLE SURVIVAL PROBABILITY MODEL
Where each trial (or missile firing) is assumed an indepen-
dent event, the development of the simple survival probability
model proceeds as follows:
?k z probability of kill of the aircraft in one shot
P
g z
probability of survival of the aircraft
m - number of missiles fired






I" [Pk + Cl-Pk)Pj = (1-Pk )
2
= 3f F s = *- [Pk * ("k )»k U-*k > 2pk] = U-*k> 3
m
m
m z m, P s r (l-Pk )
m
.
Normally, this paper considers Pk as the probability of
kill of an aircraft in one shot and m as the number of shots
fired. However, the developments presented are equally valid
for salvo fire where several missiles are fired simultaneously.
The computational procedure can be accomplished by either of
two methods for the simple survival probability model, as
follows:




- (1-.4) 2 = .36
Method 2: consider one salvo of 2 missiles where the Pk
of an Individual missile is .4, then
salvo Pk = [.4 + (1-.4J.4J = .64 , and
P Q z (1-.64) 1 = .36 , which is the same results
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achieved "by method 1.
The computation for an inbound target (case (3) of
page 5 niay also be made by averaging the salvo P^. in which





A FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE
CUMULATIVE BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION SURVIVAL PROBABILITY MODEL
As was indicated earlier in this study, the emphasis of
the investigation is on application for use by a firing doctrine
planner. A considerable variation of the parameters P^ and N
a
(introduced in Chapter I) at the same time would probably only
occur as a result of a change in design of the system Itself,
hence a complete investigation of such variation is not con-
templated here. But it is interesting to observe that the
change-over point for use of the proposed doctrine B instead
of doctrine A occurs at Ns4, which turns out to be the satura-
tion level of doctrine A. Surely, this is not a coincidence!
As a matter of fact, it takes but a moment's reflection and a
short analysis to detail the conditions unddr which change-over
will always occur at the stated point. Since the planner is
working with a given installation (and may only vary his para-
meters by employment of devices such as firing two missiles
per salvo, rearranging the spacing of the ships in the forma-
tion (or batteries in a shore installation), and so on), his
criterion is sufficiently determined by the analysis previous-
ly presented. The designer, however, might well investigate
further this particular facet of the problem.
Examining Figure 1, it is seen that, under certain condi-
tions, doctrine A (in the example presented) might again be
the more desirable doctrine in particular, when
(N-N
8B
+nB ) - (N-NSA+nA)>0.
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The problem then becomes one of designing a system around a
given saturation level and salvo kill probability. The author
feels, however, that this insert might well be of more interest
to the mathematician than to the practical designer.
It is of additional interest to observe that the measure
developed could be used by friendly forces in the determina-
tion of the number of aircraft necessary to penetrate an enemy
defense. Pk should not be too difficult to estimate; Ng could
assume any value in its possible range 0^ N
s 4 °o » the higher
values being used with conservatism.
An additional very broad application of the measure
comes to mind. Assume for the moment that White and Red are
at war and that White can attack Red with aircraft (or ship
or submarine- launched, long-range missiles) from the four
points of the compass, from each of these directions with a
different probability of penetration depending on the weather
in that location, enemy strength, the location of suitable
Red targets, and so on. White's mission is to destroy (by
special weapons) x% of the Red targets with N aircraft available
to White. The tactical planner's problem is to determine the
optimum deployment of the aircraft (or ships, etc.) for
accomplishing the mission.
Knowing the capabilities of the particular weapon to be
carried and the number carried by each plane, it is seen that
the number of planes that must actually release bombs to accom-
plish the factor x% may readily be determined. This latter
number will be equivalent to n in the development of Chapter I.
By suitable analysis and approximation, one should be able to
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determine P, values for the several directions Involved, at
least order- of- magnitude estimates and certainly in the proper
order (that is, north might be the most difficult direction of
attack and have a P, of .7» south might be the easiest with
Pj^r.2, and so on). Everything is now determined in accordance
with the Chapter I development except the quantity Pn . This
latter factor can be used as the measure of effectiveness by
the tactical planner in his determination of the number of
planes to attack Red from each direction (the sum of which
equals N) . The arrangement with the highest P offers the
most effective attack since it accomplishes the required
mission with the highest (survival) probability (and therefore
has a higher probability of doing even more damage than the
x%) . Changes in the required damage (which could result from
changes in the mission) (x%) ; the number of aircraft available
(N); and the enemy strength, weather, etc. (Pi.) will reflect
in this value of Pn . Game theory techniques could be used to




A CONSIDERATION OF TARGET INTERCEPTS VERSUS MISSILE VELOCITY
Although the matter of the number of target Intercepts
available at a given missile velocity is slightly removed from
the intent of this paper, the statement has been made (page 41)
that increased missile velocity will result in fewer intercepts
and this unusual conclusion bears proof.
Consider the following missiles where v^ is given as an
average velocity over the total path, for convenience the range
R is slant range (with a maximum firing range of 150,000 feet
and a minimum of 10,000 feeti and the target is inbound to the
launching site with a constant velocity of 2000 ft/sec. It is
assumed that increased missile velocity has not increased the






V vt= 2000 ft/sec
2000 ft/dec
,
. mL , \ (drawing not to scale)4000 ft/stec
io,too 150:000 *~
Slant Range (feet)
Target is inbound on path XY. In order to have the first
burst occur at the maximum range, the first missile must be
launched when the target is at position A. OB (in seconds)
- 150000 s 75 seconds; hence AB (in seconds) z 75 seconds.
2000




burst to occur at point of minimum firing range. BD =
150000-10000 - 70 seconds. Therefore AC = AB (BD-CD) r
2000
75 + (70-5) = 140 secondss ta - total time available for
firing missiles with velocity va .
Replacing missile "a" with missile "b", vb- 4000 ft/sec:
OB = 3-50000 = 37.5 seconds = AB
4000
OD = 10000 =2.5 seconds r CD
4000
BD - 150000-10000 - 70 seconds
2000
AC = 37.5 + (70-2.5) = 105 seconds = tb = total time available
for firing missiles with velocity v^.
It is clear that, since ta > t^, more intercepts can be
achieved using missile "a" than missile "b" , the firing rate
remaining the same for both missiles. Thus, it is seen that
increased missile velocity must be accompanied by increased
kill probability and/or increased maximum firing range for





Ea maximum single- shot expectation of kill (given that the
target Is "within the envelope" and there Is a "missile
available") per plane times the number of planes
M.E. measure of effectiveness
M, expected mortality rate (kills/second) for an 1th doc-
trine, = Pj/Ti
N number of attacking aircraft; raid size
N saturation level or the maximum number of aircraft that
can be engaged at any one instant using a particular
doctrine
P eventual state of missile, where Prl.O for success
(kill obtained) and PrO.O for failure (kill not obtain-
ed)
P. expected engagement kill probability for an 1™ doc-
1 trine
P. probability of kill of an aircraft in one shot
P probability that n or more aircraft out of a total N
aircraft will survive a given defense
P_ (simple) probability of survival of an aircraft
T. expected total engagement time for an i*"*1 doctrine
g ground system operability or the number of times the
ground system operates in a manner sufficient to launch
a missile divided by the total number of attempts to
operate the ground system
6r ground system reliability or that portion of the num-ber of times when the ground system did operate that
it was also within proper tolerances for a successful
missile launch
m number of missiles fired
m missile operability or the number of times the compon-
ent parts of the missile operate In such a manner as
to cause a proper burst divided by total attempts
m missile reliability or that portion of the number of
times when the missile did operate that the component




n the minimum number of aircraft that will survive a
given defense In accordance with the laws of proba-
bility with the total number of attacking aircraft
Is N (N>n) and the probability of kill and survival
probability are Pk and Pn respectively
p kill probability of an operable missile (which is a
function of miss distance, the latter being a function
of ground system reliability and missile reliability)
p probability of observing a kill within time t
t, time from launch to burstb
t~ missile mean failure time (where failure occurs after
launch and before burst)
t.. time to reload launcher
t average time after burst for observing a kill
t time required to switch to a different target (measur-
ed from "leave the present target" to "fire at a differ-
ent target")
v average missile velocity over the total path from
launch point to point of burst
x.% percentage of enemy targets to be destroyed in accord-











Missile-firing criteria for the tactical
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